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ARTICLES
The Real Problem With New Source Review
by Shi-Ling Hsu
Editors’ Summary: When the CAA was amended in 1977, the U.S. Congress im
posed pollution control requirements on new stationary sources of air pollution,
called new source review (NSR), but exempted existing facilities from such require
ments. By creating a more favorable regulatory environment for existing facilities
than for new ones, “grandfathering” creates an incentive to keep old facilities up
and running. Moreover, as a command and control program, requiring capital ex
penditures for pollution control equipment makes the capital sluggishness problem
worse. Combined with often confusing EPA policies and a changing political envi
ronment, NSR has resulted in a running battle between the regulated community, en
vironmentalists, and regulators over just how much work can be done on existing
sources before they become “new” sources subject to expensive pollution control
requirements. In this Article, Shi Ling Hsu examines these issues and argues for an
entirely new paradigm of pollution regulation—Pigouvian taxes and/or emissions
trading. Although these two concepts are also controversial, Hsu argues that they
are far better than the drag on capital turnover created by grandfathering and will be
advantageous for environmentalists and industry alike by eliminating perverse incen
tives for keeping outdated stationary sources online to the disadvantage of newer,
cleaner sources.

I. Introduction
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) continues to press on
with litigation against those suspected of violating the Clean
Air Act’s (CAA’s) new source review (NSR) program by
making a “major modification” on a polluting plant without
installing, as NSR requires, state-of-the-art pollution control equipment.1 In 2005, the DOJ reached settlements with
the Ohio Edison Company and Illinois Power (the latest of
nine settlements with electricity-generating firms), requiring them to install pollution control equipment to the tune of
$1.1 billion and $500 million, respectively2; with ExxonShi Ling Hsu is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of British
Columbia Faculty of Law. The author acknowledges the valuable research
assistance of David Madani and Jenny Biem and thanks Jamie Colburn
and the participants at the 2005 Tulane Environmental Conference for
their help and comments.
1. NSR requires the installation of state of the art pollution control
equipment whenever a new plant is constructed or whenever a “mod
ification” is made on an existing one. CAA §165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§7475(a)(4) (specifies that a permit must be obtained, and that it may
only be issued if “the proposed facility is subject to the best available
control technology [(BACT)]” for each pollutant regulated); CAA
§173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §7503(a)(2) (provides that the permit may
only be issued if the “proposed source is required to comply with the
lowest achievable emission rate [(LAER)]”).
2. Susan Bruninga, Air Pollution: Ohio Edison Agrees to Pay $1.1 Bil
lion to Cut Emissions 212,000 Tons From Plants, Daily Env’t Rep.
(BNA), Mar. 21, 2005, at A 1; Steve Cook, Air Pollution: Illinois
Power Agrees to Reduce Emissions in $500 Million Settlement of
EPA Lawsuit, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 8, 2005, at A 1.

Mobil’s refinery operations for $589 million (the latest of 17
settlements with refining companies)3; and even with a
number of ethanol producers.4 As well, the DOJ is pressing
ahead with perhaps its biggest NSR case of all against the
electricity giant American Electric Power Company for
modifications made to its coal-fired power plants.5 This apparently vigorous prosecution takes place even as the
George W. Bush Administration continues to reform NSR in
ways that limit the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) ability to scrutinize and challenge plant modifications. Most significantly, the Bush Administration has promulgated new rules that dramatically change the routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement (RMRR) exemption,
essentially creating a safe harbor for polluters modifying
their facilities. The rules also give polluters a more gener3. Steven D. Cook, ExxonMobil to Spend $589.4 Million to Reduce
Emissions at Seven Refineries, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Oct. 12,
2005, at A 1.
4. Steven D. Cook, Cargill Agrees to Spend $135 Million in Settlement
Involving Corn, Oilseed Facilities, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Sept. 2,
2005, at A 8; Linda Roeder, Nebraska Company to Spend $5.5 Mil
lion for Clean Air Violations Under Agreement, Daily Env’t Rep.
(BNA), Sept. 1, 2005, at A 8; Christopher Brown, Missouri Ethanol
Maker to Install $2 Million in Pollution Controls Under Consent
Decree, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Apr. 11, 2005, A 13.
5. At the time of writing of this Article, the trial had taken place and the
parties were awaiting a verdict, the loser likely to appeal. See, e.g.,
Darren Samuelsohn, Courts Still in Play Despite NSR Policy Shift,
Greenwire, Oct. 17, 2005, at http://www.eenews.net/sr nsr.htm
(last visited Dec. 29, 2005).
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ous baseline allowance in determining whether their modification will result in an emissions increase, a finding that
would trigger NSR. Having survived a major court challenge,6 the core parts of the policy appear to be in place for
at least the duration of this Administration, and probably
beyond.7 Even if a Democrat gains the Presidency in 2008,
it will be politically difficult to change it back, as many
firms will claim to have relied upon this formulation for
long-term planning.
Despite the apparently ephemeral nature of the DOJ victories, it is important to stop and examine some important
lessons from the bruising legal battles that have characterized NSR for over a decade. This is especially true since neither the Bush Administration nor its critics grasp what is
truly flawed with NSR. The problems with NSR are twofold:
(1) it is part and parcel of the larger mistake of grandfathering; and (2) it is defined mostly in terms of the installation of
pollution control equipment. Both of these aspects of NSR
retard the turnover of polluting capital, locking in obsolete
old facilities, such as 80-year-old coal-fired power plants, and
giving them economic reasons to live well past their original
intended retirement date. This capital sluggishness is bad
from both an environmental and economic perspective.

plant’s life.11 This concept of exempting certain existing investments has become known as “grandfathering.”
The main problem with grandfathering seems obvious in
retrospect: by creating a more favorable (in some cases
much more favorable) regulatory environment for existing
facilities than for new ones, grandfathering creates an incentive to keep old, grandfathered facilities up and running. The
grandfather status of a plant becomes a valuable asset. NSR
is part and parcel of the misguided concept of grandfathering. Grandfathering necessarily requires some distinction between those that will be exempt and those that
will not. NSR is that dividing line. Without NSR, grandfathering is a nonsensical concept.
The grandfathering debate is already well underway, and
the political stars may not be currently aligned to get rid of
grandfathering. But the NSR debate is misdirected. Parties
to the NSR debate argue over its form while failing to acknowledge its role in grandfathering or the perverse incentives the present NSR program creates. This Article is intended to redirect the NSR debate and identify what is truly
at stake.

II. NSR and Grandfathering

Grandfathering, the exemption of certain existing facilities
from pollution control requirements, produces a drag on the
turnover of polluting capital by creating a huge incentive to
patch up old plants and keep them running. In the normal
course of business, aging plants with lower efficiencies and
higher repair costs eventually give way to new plants. But
grandfathering presents a compelling reason to defer that
move: the fact that a new plant would require pollution controls that cost millions or hundreds of millions of dollars.
Estimates of the cost of installing pollution control equipment vary, even with respect to specific pollution control devices.12 One widely respected study on coal-fired power
plants reported by the National Research Council estimated
installation costs for a full complement of pollution control
devices to add approximately 25% to the cost of capital, increasing the cost of a new 600-megawatt power plant from
approximately $600 million to $750 million.13 Grandfathering in this example thus provides a $150 million asset. What
would you do to protect a $150 million asset? Certainly, it
would occur to you to band-aid over problems wherever and
whenever possible to prolong the life of the plant and exploit
this competitive advantage as long as possible. In addition
to band-aiding, owners of grandfathered facilities have certainly found it worthwhile to incur some legal and lobbying
expenses to help preserve their grandfathering asset. At the
very least, it is worth some effort to defer such an expenditure as long as possible by keeping a grandfathered plant

When the U.S. Congress amended the CAA in 1977 and imposed new pollution control requirements, or “new source
review,” on stationary sources of air pollution, it exempted
existing facilities. Exempt facilities would not be subject to
NSR, which requires the installation of best available control technology (BACT)8 or equipment and processes that
achieve the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER),9 effectively pegging the requirement to industry practices. The
rationale behind the exemption was that a dramatic and sudden regulatory change frustrated the expectations of owners
of existing facilities and would discourage investment.
Democratically accountable governments do not change the
rules in the middle of the game, it was argued.10 Besides, it
was reasoned, installing pollution control equipment was
much more efficiently done at the new construction stage,
rather than patched on at some point in the middle of a
6. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 35 ELR 20135 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
7. The rules, discussed more fully below, were originally proposed in
2002 and 2003, finalized in 2004, and then re opened for comment
and reconsideration on July 1, 2004. 69 Fed. Reg. 40278 (July 1,
2004). After reconsideration, the rule was made final on June 10,
2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 33838 (June 10, 2005).
8. CAA §165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4). BACT is required in “at
tainment areas,” airsheds in which ambient levels of pollution are be
low levels established by EPA and determined not to pose a hazard to
human health.
9. Id. §173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §7503(a)(2). Technology and practices
achieving the LAER are required in “nonattainment areas,” airsheds
in which ambient levels of pollution exceed the levels established by
EPA and deemed to be acceptable for human health.
10. This point, often raised in connection with regulatory takings cases,
was first raised in the electric utility regulation area in an influential
white paper by three economists that warned of the consequences of
allowing unfettered electricity deregulation without compensating
existing plant owners for the loss in value of “stranded costs,” claim
ing that those plants would become far less valuable because of the
sudden changeover into a competitive environment. See William J.
Baumol et al., The Challenge for Federal and State Regu
lators: Transition From Regulation to Efficient Competi
tion in Electric Power 33 (1994) (on file with author).

III. Grandfathering’s Drag on Capital Turnover

11. National Research Council, Interim Report of the Commit
tee on Changes in New Source Review Programs for Sta
tionary Sources of Air Pollutants 23 (Nat’l Academies Press
2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309095786/html/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
12. For a review of some of the cost studies, see National Research
Council, supra note 11, at 111 12 . This estimate contemplates
up to date pollution control equipment to control emissions of ox
ides of nitrogen (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and particulate matter.
13. The study is E.S. Rubin et al., Integrated Environmental Modeling of
Coal Fired Power Systems, 47 J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass’n 1180
(1997), cited in National Research Council, supra note 11, at
111, and the estimate was based on costs of installing controls of SO2
and NOx emissions.
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running. As a policy matter, then, breaking out of this regulatory paradigm has been problematic for political and economic reasons.
What about the perspective of the new entrant, which
faces NSR requirements that incumbents do not? A new entrant will deploy new and cleaner technologies with lower
variable costs, but it must achieve a variable cost advantage
great enough to overcome the cost of new capital. In this numerical example, the cost of new capital is increased by
$150 million, and the relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent rivals $150 million greater, pushing some new
plant investments further into the future. The net effect of
grandfathering is that newer, cleaner plants are sometimes
left unbuilt. Older, dirtier plants keep running.
Several widely accepted empirical studies now confirm
these economic intuitions. There is a clearly emerging consensus in the scholarly literature that grandfathering retards
capital turnover.14 And a quick look at the electric utility sector is sobering: 57% of all power plants were built before
1972, while 35% are more than 50 years old.15Some power
plants even were built in the 1920s.16 The 1990 CAA
Amendments, which brought into being the first large-scale
“cap-and-trade” form of emissions trading program, was
enacted by Congress with an expectation that many of the
oldest and dirtiest power plants would be retired. This has
not exactly panned out: from 1990 to 2000, only 10 of the
263 coal-fired plants originally subject to the CAA Amendments were retired.17
This capital sluggishness in the coal-fired power industry
is especially surprising since the 1990s was a decade in
which natural gas deregulation delivered fairly stable and
historically lower natural gas prices.18 There were also tech14. See, e.g., Michael T. Maloney & Gordon L. Brady, Capital Turnover
and Marketable Pollution Rights, 31 J.L. & Econ. 203 (1988);
Randy A. Nelson et al., Differential Environmental Regulation: Ef
fects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75 Rev.
Econ. & Stat. 368 (1993); Frank M. Gollup & Marc J. Roberts, En
vironmental Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of
Fossil Fueled Electric Power Generation, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 654
(1983); Robert N. Stavins, The Effects of Vintage Differen
tiated Environmental Regulation (Related Publication 05 03)
(AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2005).
15. U.S. General Accounting Office, Emissions From Older
Electricity Generating Units 2 (2002).
16. Tina Kaarsberg et al., The Clean Air Innovative Technol
ogy Link: Enhancing Efficiency in the Electricity Industry
(Northeast Midwest Inst. 1999).
17. The 1990 CAA Amendments created a new regulatory regime gov
erning the emissions of SO2 and NOx, known as the Acid Rain Pro
gram. The Acid Rain Program established an aggregate allowable
tonnage of SO2 emissions, applied this “cap” to 263 named electric
ity generating units, and issued tradable allowances to these units to
emit a reduced quantity of SO2 emissions. These units, specified in
§404 of the CAA, were almost exclusively coal fired plants, and it
was expected that the cost of a tradable allowance would cause a sub
stantial number of them to be retired. Richard E. Cohen, Wash
ington at Work 68 (1995). The expected wave of retirements has
not occurred, however. From 1990 to 1999, only 7 of the original
263 were retired. U.S. EPA, 1998 Compliance Report: Acid
Rain Program app. B (1999) (EPA 430 R 99 010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/cmprpt/app98index.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2006). In 2000, an additional three were retired. U.S. Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), Inventory of Electric Utility Power Plants in the
United States 2000, at 9 (2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/cneaf/electricity/ipp/ipp00.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
18. From 1981 to 1986, the average wellhead price of natural gas pro
duced in the United States was $2.35 per thousand cubic feet. From
1987 to 1999, the average wellhead price was $1.86 per thousand cu
bic feet. U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Natural Gas
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nical reasons to prefer natural gas. Natural gas-fired power
plants convert usable energy more efficiently than coalfired power plants.19 Natural gas-fired power plants start
up and shut down quickly, making them more able to respond to peak loads and spikes in energy usage.20 Capital
and fixed costs of natural gas-fired power plants are substantially lower than those of coal-fired plants—barely onethird—making them a less daunting capital investment.21 So
what happened in the 1990s? From 1990 to 1999, the share
of electricity produced by natural gas increased from
10.67% to 13.40%, while the share produced by coal decreased from 54.19% to 52.65%22—hardly a sea change.
There are a number of possible reasons for the failure of
natural gas power plants to take root. Electricity remains,
despite rumblings of deregulation in the 1990s, a regulated
industry. Significant changes such as fuel switching are not
encouraged in regulated environments. Shedding capital is
not encouraged in an industry already incentivized for
overcapitalization.23 Siting difficulties for new plants may
also have played a part, although this does not explain the
failure to repower existing coal-fired plants at their existing
locations as natural gas plants. In the past six years, volatile
Wellhead Prices, at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3A.
htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). Of course, with the energy crises
of the turn of the century, this decline in natural gas prices infa
mously and dramatically reversed itself in 2000. The point here is
that even while gas prices were declining, natural gas power plants
did not proliferate.
19. Energy efficiency is measured by the average thermal conversion
rate, or “heat rate.” Heat rate data collected by DOE’s Energy Infor
mation Administration is considered confidential information. U.S.
Energy Information Administration, U.S. DOE, Electric
Power Annual 2003, at 65 (2003), available at http://tonto.eia.
doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/034803.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2005). Accurate data on heat rates are therefore elusive, but it is clear
that natural gas fired power plants almost invariably have lower
(more efficient) heat rates than coal fired power plants. See, e.g., II
U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. DOE, Elec
tric Power Annual 2000, at 110 (2002); Richard L. Bain et al.,
Biomass Fired Power Generation, Conference Paper for Biomass
Usage for Utility and Industrial Power, Snowbird, Utah, at 10, tbl.
2 (1996), at http://www.portalenergy.com/common/tech/tech017/
bio09.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
20. Larry Goldstein et al., Gas Fired Distributed Energy Re
source Technology Characterizations 15, 18 (Report No.
NREL/TP 620 34783) (2003), available at http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy04osti/34783.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005); Christopher
F. Thornburg, Of Megawatts and Men: Understanding the
Causes of the California Power Crisis 14 (UCLA Anderson
Forecast 2001), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/
christopher.thornberg/docso/pdfoth/Megawatts.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2005).
21. U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. DOE, An
nual Energy Outlook 2005 fig. 71 (2005), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/electricity.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2005). See also U.S. Energy Information Administration,
U.S. DOE, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy
Markets and Economic Activity 73, tbl. 16 (1998), available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/service/oiaf9803.pdf (last vis
ited Nov. 22, 2005).
22. U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. DOE, An
nual Energy Review 2004, at 229, tbl. 8.2b (2005), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2005).
23. A long admired and often cited article has hypothesized, with some
evidence, that regulated firms such as electric utilities tend to acquire
more capital than would a profit maximizing firm in a competitive
environment, a result of the incentives created by the regulatory
commission structure. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behav
ior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. Econ. Rev.
1052 (1962).
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natural gas prices have been a factor,24 but this does not explain the reluctance to switch to natural gas in the 1990s.
Thus, while the power-plant fuel choice decision is an enormously complicated decision to model, the grandfathering
explanation still seems to be a powerful one.
The capital sluggishness caused in part by grandfathering
is an economic distortion with economic costs. Any governmental policy-induced preference for an allocation of resources creates a distortion that creates deadweight loss. In
the case of grandfathering, the distortion is particularly pernicious because it slows the pace of technological progress.
Older plants with older processes are simply less reliable
and less efficient than new plants in converting usable energy into electricity.25 Slowing the replacement of old plants
slows the march of technological progress and, as a result,
perpetuates higher product costs. Such is the irony of an incentive to retain capital: firms may actually choose a more
costly production process because the new one would require expensive pollution controls.
Of course, a distortion in one market may be justified by
its corrective effect in another market. A gasoline tax alters
consumer behavior but internalizes pollution externalities
related to the production and consumption of gas. Could we
say something similarly ameliorative about coal-fired
power plants? Hardly. Rather, with technological advances
in pollution control equipment, a bias toward older capital is
a bias against better pollution control equipment and a perpetuation of pollution externalities. Per megawatt hour
(Mwh) of electricity produced, coal-fired power plants built
before 1950 emitted an average of 20.58 pounds (lbs.) of
sulfur dioxide (SO2) per Mwh of electricity produced, while
coal-fired power plants built after 1990 emitted only 3.88
lbs.26 The average nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions rate for
pre-1950 plants was 5.51 lbs. per Mwh, while for post-1990
plants the rate was 3.15.27 From the environmental perspective, a better choice of fuel would be natural gas, the combustion of which per unit of energy produced emits only
33% of the carbon dioxide (CO2), 10% of the NOx, and virtually none of the SO2, particulate matter, or mercury emitted by coal-fired plants.28 But even this modest technologi24. From 2000 to 2004, the average U.S. wellhead price has been $4.20
per thousand cubic feet. U.S. Energy Information Administration,
supra note 18. Spot prices in California rose from about $3 per mil
lion British thermal units (mmBtus) in mid 1999 to over $6 per
mmBtus by December of 2000. Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran
cisco, Mary Daly, Economic Letter 2001 04, February 9, 2001: Eco
nomic Impact of Rising Natural Gas Prices, at http://www.frbsf.
org/publications/economics/letter/2001/el2001 04.html (last vis
ited Nov. 22, 2005).
25. Thermal efficiency for fossil fuel fired power plants is often mea
sured as “heat rate,” which is essentially the conversion of usable en
ergy in fuel (coal, natural gas, or oil) into usable electricity. See, e.g.,
National Research Council, supra note 11, at 82, tbl. 3 3b
(showing how average heat rates show increasing efficiency with
more recent vintages); Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environ
ment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1002,
1046 47 (1987). Note also that many modifications undertaken at
power plants are intended to improve the heat rate. See, e.g., United
States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 838, 33 ELR 20253
(S.D. Ohio 2003).
26. National Research Council, supra note 11, tbl. 3 3b.
27. Id. at 81, tbl. 3 3a.
28. State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administra
tors & Association of Local Air Pollution Control Offi
cials (STAPPA & ALAPCO), Reducing Greenhouse Gases
and Air Pollution: A Menu of Harmonized Options xv
(2000). This assumes that the natural gas fired power plants are of
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cal advance is evidently not in the cards, given the incentives to patch up old coal-fired plants, and especially given
high natural gas prices.
What of the argument that failure to grandfather would
chill investment? This argument has clearly been taken too
far, with the original grandfathering provision now going on
33 years. But maybe this argument should hold no water at
all. Given the rate at which we are learning about the harmful effects of pollution, a slight chill in investment might not
be a bad thing from the standpoint of overall social welfare.
Entrepreneurs contemplating expensive capital investments
are extremely sophisticated in projecting the economics of
the investment for decades hence. Is it so unreasonable to
expect some environmental foresight as well? Perhaps,
rather than having myopia rewarded by grandfathering, entrepreneurs should have some incentive to look beyond the
narrow profit focus and consider the possible environmental
consequences of a large capital investment. Perhaps grandfathering is really just an unwise reinforcement of a human
propensity to forge ahead without adequate consideration of
the consequences.
Grandfathering seems like a sensible policy to a layperson, drawing as it does on notions of fairness. It seems unfair
to change regulation after someone has invested in something as expensive as a power plant or an oil refinery. This
perception of unfairness overlooks the moral hazard29 problems created by this sympathy, as any fairness-based exemption does. One never knows if an entrepreneur had a legitimate expectation of regulatory stability when making an
expensive investment or if the entrepreneur was racing to
beat a clock that she knew was ticking. This leads to difficult
and ultimately intractable line-drawing exercises. On a
more fundamental level, this kind of fairness-thinking is
flawed in that it focuses on the hardships, real or perceived,
on incumbents—those with existing facilities that would be
grandfathered—and ignores the hardships that are visited
upon those that might have planned for, but did not begin,
construction of a new plant.
Thus, grandfathering is not, as its beneficiaries would argue, the sign of a democratically accountable government
paying heed to property rights or of an open government
maximizing overall societal welfare. Grandfathering is a
simple transfer payment to those with grandfathered plants
from those that lack them.
IV. NSR’s Drag on Capital Turnover
NSR’s harmful economic and environmental effects are not
limited to it being part of the bad idea of grandfathering.
NSR is a command-and-control program that requires the
installation of expensive polluting capital, making the capital turnover problem worse. While the core legal problem
the “combined cycle” variety, which involves the recovery of waste
heat to power a separate turbine. See also Byron Swift, The Bene
fits and Costs of Moving From Coal to Natural Gas Power
Generation (Envtl. L. Inst. 2000).
29. “Moral hazard” is the term given to problems of information asym
metry in which one party must act in relation to another based on the
other’s actions, but which are not known to the first party. This pro
duces an incentive for the second party to “shirk” or deceive the first.
This problem receives much attention in areas such as insurance
where insurers have no way of controlling or monitoring the behav
ior of the insured that may increase the risk of an insurance payout.
See, e.g., Andreu Mas Colell et al., Microeconomic Theory
478 88 (1995).
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with sluggish capital turnover in the electricity generating
industry is grandfathering, NSR exacerbates the capitalization problem by requiring power plants to install pollution
control equipment, adding to their capital base and creating
an even stronger incentive to maintain and prolong the life
of existing facilities. Once pollution control equipment is installed, the firm will strive to protect that equipment, particularly against further regulation that would devalue it. Nobody buys a multimillion dollar piece of equipment and then
abandons it willingly.
The problem with NSR is that it is defined in terms of requiring the installation of pollution control equipment. Pursuant to the CAA, EPA has specified seven criteria air pollutants—pollutants for which EPA has established a threshold of exposure above which adverse human health effects
may occur. For each pollutant, then, an airshed can be in “attainment” status—the pollutant concentration is below the
threshold level—or “nonattainment” status—the pollutant
concentration exceeds the threshold level. For areas designated as being in attainment status, NSR requires new
sources or those undergoing a major modification to install
the BACT.30 For areas designated under the CAA as in
“nonattainment” status, NSR requires new sources or those
undergoing a major modification to face a more demanding
requirement, installing equipment that obtains the LAER.31
Defining compliance in terms of expensive pollution control equipment installation makes some sense if one is a lawyer. It is a corrective action that matches the punishment
with the offense, using the punishment to ameliorate the
harm from the offense, like requiring some criminal offenders to perform community service as part of their punishment. But this is wrong-headed for dealing with polluters.
This sort of corrective action creates its own incentives for
ex post behavior that runs counter to the overall goal of reducing pollution. With most polluting industries, expensive
capital is purchased to mass produce consumer goods that
yield profit margins that are orders of magnitude less than
the cost of capital. Thus, the small profit margins on these
goods must be multiplied by the sale of the thousands of
items produced in order for the capital to begin to pay for itself. Plants are thus designed to last long periods of time to
enable the plant owner to recoup the large capital costs.
Electricity, sold to thousands of customers in relatively
small quantities and for relatively small amounts of money,
must be sold in large quantities and for many years in order
for the power plant to recoup its cost.
What happens to the economic environment when a plant
owner is forced by legal mandate to add to the cost of the
plant? It might pass these costs onto consumers, but it might
not. In a highly regulated environment such as electricity,
the state electricity regulatory commission may not allow
cost pass-through. Alternatively, in a highly competitive environment, a plant owner may not be able to pass these costs
onto consumers because competitors will undercut them in
the marketplace. Thus, in many instances, when a plant
owner is legally required to install pollution control equipment, it will simply find a way to operate the plant longer in
order to maintain profitability.
The advantage of defining NSR in terms of pollution control requirements is, obviously, that pollution control equip30. CAA §165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4).
31. Id. §173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §7503(a)(2).
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ment reduces emissions. At the same time, NSR is probably
forestalling the retirement of some facilities, which may,
over the long run, emit more pollution. Whether the immediate emissions reductions outweigh the long-term effect of
keeping an old plant running is an empirical question. With
pollution control equipment such as flue gas desulfurization, or “scrubbers,” that remove 85% to 90% of the SO2
content from power plant emissions,32 it is unlikely that the
life-extending effects of NSR would have the net effect of
increasing SO2 emissions, even over the long term. For
other devices that are less effective in reducing emissions, it
is entirely possible that the life-extending effects of NSR
would result in more pollution over time.
There is also the bigger problem of pollutants other than
those controlled by the pollution control equipment. While
scrubbers dramatically reduce emissions of SO2 from coalfired power plants, a separate piece of equipment must be
purchased and installed to control NOx emissions. While
some scrubbers also reduce emissions of mercury,33 they do
nothing about the elephant in the room, the problem of CO2
emissions. And in no case do any of these pollution control
measures account for other, pre-combustion externalities,
such as the environmental harm of finding, extracting, and
transporting coal.
The nine NSR settlements with electric utilities in 2005
netted $3.9 billion in pollution control equipment.34 How
long will it take for the utilities to recoup the cost of these investments? Making utilities spend this kind of money may
be somewhat satisfying, but we must consider how this
changes their decisionmaking environment.
In terms of emissions, therefore, it is an important and
open empirical question as to whether pollution control
equipment required by NSR results in overall lower emissions of the controlled pollutant. But the even more important question is whether NSR’s piecemeal approach to
pollution will, in the grand scheme of things, facilitate a
solution or bring about a political train wreck when the
United States finally reckons with the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental organizations seem
to believe that in the end, they can politically and legally
prevail on all counts. My own guess is that the best of several bad outcomes could be a massive, costly, and poorly administered taxpayer-financed switchover of electricity-generated technologies.
While pollution controls are reducing current emissions,
they are also further entrenching older technologies. Saddling firms with expensive pollution control technology
gives them something to care about, and it’s not the environment. Rather, the expensive nature of the equipment will almost guarantee that the firm’s main interest will be in preserving the value of the pollution control equipment. In the
meantime, the plethora of other environmental externalities
will not only be ignored by the polluter, but will represent
salient threats to the pollution control equipment.
32. National Research Council, supra note 11, at 83. Babcock and
Wilcox, makers of flue gas desulfurization systems, advertises a
95% removal efficiency. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, Envi
ronmental Projects, at http://www.babcock.com/pgg/tt/brochures
environmental.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). Another maker,
Ducon, advertises a removal efficiency of 99%. Ducon, Flue Gas
Desulfurization, at http://www.ducon.com/flue gas desulfurization.
php (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
33. See Ducon, supra note 32.
34. National Research Council, supra note 11, at 43 44, tbl. 2 1.
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V. The Legal Battlefield and the Bush Administration
Interventions
Apart from the perverse incentives created by NSR and
grandfathering, there is a problem with the inevitably legalistic nature of NSR. The problem arises when, instead of
tearing down a plant and building a new one—an event that
would clearly trigger NSR and require the installation of
pollution control equipment—a plant owner rebuilds a plant
piece by piece, gradually changing the plant, but without
ever triggering NSR and without ever installing pollution
control equipment. To address this issue, EPA promulgated
regulations that provide that any “major modification”
would also trigger NSR.35 “Major modification” was defined as “a physical change in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source that would result in: (1)
a significant emissions increase of a regulated NSR pollutant; and (2) a significant net emissions increase of that pollutant from the major stationary source.”36 However, plants
that undertake what are deemed to be RMRR will not be
deemed to have undertaken a “major modification” and will
not be subject to NSR requirements.37
It is not hard to imagine how all this verbiage, at the crux
of the American Electric Power, Illinois Power, and Ohio
Edison cases as well as the scores of other NSR cases, can
serve as an endless source of litigation. Indeed, in the many
years of NSR practice, it has provided lucrative employment for many private firm lawyers and a decent living for
government lawyers and environmental advocates. On the
one side of the NSR battlefield are the trade associations of
polluting industries. On the other side are the environmental
organizations and state attorneys general of northeastern
states suffering from downwind pollution from midwestern
power plants. It may only be a mild overstatement to say that
these parties are the only people who believe that NSR
makes any sense. They just happen to disagree on what NSR
should mean. Industry trade associations argue that NSR
should be less stringent, less ambiguous, and infrequently
applied.38 This is their ideal regulatory environment because grandfathering is preserved to protect their market
power and lock out new entrants, while a lenient NSR program permits them a free hand in revamping their plants
without governmental interference. Litigating environmental organizations and the northeastern states offer a much
more inclusive interpretation of “major modification,” hoping to sweep as many plant operation changes into NSR as
possible and force plant owners to either build new plants or
install modern pollution controls.39
A variety of issues have cropped up in litigation and
rulemaking in attempting to establish the confines of NSR.
A short description of just a few of these follows.
35.
36.
37.
38.

50 C.F.R. §§51.166, 52.21.
Id. §§51.166(b)(2)(i), 52.21(b)(2)(i).
Id. §§51.166(b)(2)(iii)(a), 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(a).
See, e.g., Edison Electric Institute, Straight Talk About
Electric Utilities and New Source Review (2001), available
at http://www.eei.org/industry issues/environment/air/New Source
Review/NSRST.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). See also other Edi
son Electric Institute position papers at Edison Electric Institute,
New Source Review, at http://www.eei.org/industry issues/environment/
air/New Source Review/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
39. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10, 35 ELR 20135 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
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A. What Constitutes RMRR
NSR is not triggered if the modification can be characterized as RMRR40 (the RMRR exclusion). Courts have created several fault lines on what is “routine.” A split among
the courts opened up in United States v. Ohio Edison Co.41
and United States v. Duke Energy Corp.,42 with the Ohio Edison court finding it “highly probative” that a modification
was characterized as a “capital expense” in their financial
statements,43 while the Duke Energy court looked to industry practice to determine how routine a modification was.44
In United States v. Alabama Power,45 the court reached the
same result as in Duke Energy, but explicitly rejected the
Duke Energy court’s statutory construction exercise, preferring to interpret “routine” based on EPA’s practices and policies.46 If one is looking for some certainty or consistency in
this area of law, this line of cases does not provide any encouragement. One of the few points of agreement between
the litigating parties in United States v. Southern Indiana
Gas & Electric Co.47 was that considering the applicability
of the RMRR exclusion “entails a fact-intensive, case-bycase determination, taking into account factors such as the
project’s nature, extent, frequency, and cost.”48
This would have seemed to be a fertile source of litigation, but the Bush Administration has created a bright-line
test, generally allowing modifications to be characterized as
routine if the modification costs less than 20% of the original plant construction cost.49 This change is certainly helpful to those plant owners thinking about updating plant operations—it quite possibly sweeps just about everything that
plant owners could want to do to their plants under the
RMRR exclusion. An enormous fraction of common repair
and replacement activities can be accomplished for less than
20% of the original plant construction cost,50 and for those
that typically cost more, plant owners will almost certainly
find ingenious ways to gradually update their plants in increments costing less than 20% of the original plant cost. A
20% threshold is about as clear as a rule could be and laudably makes NSR less bureaucratic. But the problem with
regulatory certainty in this case is that the breadth of this accommodating version of the RMRR exclusion virtually
guarantees that NSR will never be triggered.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

40 C.F.R. §§52.01(d)(1), 52.21(b)(2)(iii), 52.24(f)(5).
276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 33 ELR 20253 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
Duke Energy, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 633 34.
372 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
Id. at 1294 95.
245 F. Supp. 2d 944 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
Id. at 999.
68 Fed. Reg. 61248 (Oct. 27, 2003). There are other requirements
that must be met before the RMRR exclusion applies. The replaced
component: (1) must be identical or functionally equivalent; (2) must
not alter the basic design parameters of the process unit; and (3) must
not cause the process unit to exceed any emission limitation or oper
ational limitation (that has the effect of constraining emissions) that
applies to any component of the process unit and that is legally en
forceable. 70 Fed. Reg. at 33838 01.
50. National Research Council, supra note 11, at 216 26. Tables
D 1 to D 3 show typical costs of repair activities in coal fired power
plants, refineries, and pulp and paper mills. Note that the typical
original capital cost of coal fired power plants is on the order of
$1,000 per kilowatt, dwarfing most of the repair costs listed in Table
D 1.
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B. Measuring Past Emissions
A modification only triggers NSR if it results in a significant
net increase in emissions of a criteria pollutant regulated under the CAA. How does one determine what the future emissions will be after the modification? And how does one measure the past emissions?
Measuring past emissions seems like the easier task, but
has been nearly as fraught with litigation as the future emissions question. Following the 1977 CAA Amendments that
led to the NSR program, EPA took the position that the baseline emissions would be based upon the potential to emit,
and that a modification triggered NSR if it “increases the potential emission rate of any air pollutant regulated under the
act.”51 Parts of the EPA rule were struck down by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,52 after which EPA promulgated a
new rule specifying that the baseline would be determined
by the average emissions rate (in tons per year) over the two
years immediately preceding the modification, subject to
EPA making some exceptions on a case-by-case basis if the
previous two years do not represent “normal operation.”53
The Bush Administration has made it considerably easier
for polluters to avoid a showing of a significant net increase
in emissions by allowing polluters to choose a baseline period. Rather than being forced to use the immediately preceding 2 years to establish baseline emissions, electric utilities now can use any consecutive 24 months out of the 5
years preceding the modification to establish their baseline,
and non-utilities can “look back” in any of the preceding 10
years to find an appropriate 24-month averaging period.54
C. Measuring Future Emissions
And what is an “increase”? How does one determine what
the future, post-modification emissions will be? Does an increase in the hours of production constitute an increase?
What if the modification makes the plant more efficient, but
leads to a productivity increase that increases emissions?
That was the fact pattern that led to the cases Puerto Rican
Cement Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,55 and
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly,56 in which EPA took
the position that future emissions would be determined by
the sources’ potential to emit after the modification, the
so-called actual-to-potential test. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit split on the actual-to-potential test issue,
with the Seventh Circuit invalidating its application and distinguishing its case from Puerto Rican Cement on factual
grounds.57 Thereafter, EPA promulgated a new test only for
electric utilities, measuring future emissions by a projection
of post-modification emissions (now referred to as the actual-to-projected-actual test), while maintaining the actual-to-potential test for non-utilities.58 Significantly, and
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

43 Fed. Reg. 26380, 26403 (June 19, 1978).
636 F.2d 323, 10 ELR 20001 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
45 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52736 (Aug. 7, 1980).
67 Fed. Reg. 80189, 80278 (Dec. 31, 2002).
889 F.2d 292, 20 ELR 20259 (1st Cir. 1989).
893 F.2d 901, 20 ELR 20414 (7th Cir. 1990).
Wisconsin Electric, 893 F.2d at 917.
57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July 21, 1992).
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predictably the source of more litigation, the new actualto-projected-actual test excluded increases in emissions that
cause growth in demand for electricity, the so-called demand growth exclusion.59
The Bush Administration has again intervened, putting
its thumb decisively down on the scale and again helping
polluters avoid a determination that their modification resulted in a significant net increase in emissions. By regulation in 2002, the Bush Administration now allows all pollution sources, rather than just power plants, to use the actualto-projected-actual test.60 It also expanded the utilities’ demand growth exclusion to non-utilities.61 Even more recently, EPA proposed a rule that would exclude any power
plant modifications that do not increase hourly emissions,
another way to avoid triggering NSR.62 Combined with the
changes that make it easier for a polluter to choose a favorable 24-month baseline period, these rule changes will make
it difficult for EPA to demonstrate a significant net emissions increase.
VI. Whither, Spy vs. Spy?
The environmental side—environmental organizations and
northeastern state attorneys general—is right to be outraged. But they are outraged at the wrong thing. They seem
outraged that they have lost and that many plants will never
be required to install pollution control equipment under the
NSR program. The target of their outrage should be the fact
that the Bush Administration’s kinder, gentler NSR policy
will cause much polluting capital to stay with us for a long,
long time. Instead, the environmental side seems to long
for a return to the legal battlefield and the decades-old legal wrangling that has become reminiscent of the old Spy
vs. Spy cartoons, a comic symbol of futility in conflict.
Do we still believe that we can wrestle the legal issues
down and impose the putative environmental solution—the installation of pollution control equipment—on
the polluting industries?
This advocacy view fails to comprehend the fruitlessness
of drawing a workable dividing line for the argument over
the meaning of “major modification.” Is there really any
general resolution to the highly litigated legal issues discussed above—the routineness of modifications, the measure of past and future emissions? With such high stakes,
this is doomed to be a never ending debate. There is simply
no principled way of drawing an NSR line between grandfathered plants and non-grandfathered plants that will be
free of controversy and litigation.
Thus, as EPA and the DOJ trot out one victorious settlement after another, there are thousands of unlitigated cases
against plant owners that have simply updated their plants
without updating pollution controls and taken the position
that they are undertaking something less than a “major modification” and instead are engaging in routine maintenance,
repair, and replacement exempt from NSR. These plant
owners are comforted by the ambiguity of the law and by the
fact that even if they have gone too far in self-serving interpretation, the chances of an enforcement action are ex59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 32323 28.
67 Fed. Reg. at 80275.
Id. at 80277.
70 Fed. Reg. 60181 (Oct. 20, 2005).
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tremely low, given the resource limitations of enforcement
officials. An Ohio district court, in hearing an NSR case,
took note of this and lambasted EPA for “an abysmal breakdown in the administrative process following the passage of
the” CAA. The court repeatedly scolded EPA for inconsistent enforcement:
This Court takes note of the fact that three decades after
passage of the Clean Air Act the EPA finally moved,
through this and several other lawsuits, to finally resolve
this fundamental issue under the Act. While the law has
always been clear, the enforcement strategies of the
EPA have not. It is clear to this Court that at various
times since 1970 officials of the EPA have been remiss
in enforcing the law and clarifying its application to spe
cific projects.63

The court’s criticism of EPA is misplaced. “Clarifying
its application to specific projects” will be a constant exercise in ad hoc determinations, and all the while with EPA at
a distinct informational advantage vis-à-vis the applicant.
It is inconceivable that EPA could make enough determinations to create a settled law of what does trigger NSR and
what does not. When millions or hundreds of millions of
dollars are at stake, there will always be an argument made
as to why a specific project is not a modification that triggers NSR.
True reform requires attacking the entire grandfathering
concept and moving to an entirely new paradigm of pollution regulation. Environmentalists should not be, as they
currently are, arguing for their particular conception of
NSR; they should be recognizing the ultimate futility in trying to distinguish between “new” and “existing” sources
and looking for ways to regulate that do not require the
drawing of unpalatable distinctions. Besides, this never
ending game does nothing to move our economy along in
transitioning to newer and hopefully cleaner technologies.
VII. The Ignored Economist’s Solution
It is incredible that at least in North America, economists
have been united for decades on the best pollution control
policy instrument and that they are bitterly opposed by both
environmentalists and industry. What economists have proposed often and loudly is the levy of Pigouvian,64 or perunit-of-pollution, taxes. A tax levied per quantity of pollution emitted would accomplish three things: (1) it would
send a price signal to polluters that their activity is causing
harm to others; (2) it would induce firms to adopt pollution
reduction measures where and when they are most effective;
and (3) it would provide incentives to polluters to find new
ways to reduce pollution. All this assumes that a Pigouvian
63. Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
64. “Pigouvian” taxes, named after the economist Alfred Pigou, are fees
levied on a unit of pollutant emitted. For a more detailed discussion
of this theory, see William Baumol & Wallace Oates, The
Theory of Environmental Policy 21 23 (3d ed. 1996). This
Pigouvian emission tax is very closely related to a cap and trade
program; both seek to place a specific cost on the emission of a
specified unit of a pollutant, with theoretically the same effects.
The difference is only that of who pays for the emissions reduc
tions in the case of an emission tax, polluters pay and taxpayers
benefit, and in the case of a cap and trade program, there is revenue
neutrality. While there has been strong resistance to cap and trade
programs, hostility toward taxes in the United States has, for the time
being, ruled out virtually any kind of a Pigouvian tax, no matter what
economists may say.
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tax is enforceable. While this is not necessarily true, in most
cases it seems fair to say that enforcement of a Pigouvian tax
program would at least be no more of a problem than it is
with traditional, pollution control equipment-oriented,
command-and-control programs, in which enforcement is
expensive and, as the NSR program demonstrates, litigation-intensive.
An alternative to pollution taxes is the use of tradable
emissions permits, licenses to emit a quantity of pollution
that can be bought and sold among polluters. Ideally, the
number of permits is capped at some level that is deemed to
be an acceptable level of pollution.65 These programs are
typically referred to as “cap-and-trade” programs. As with a
pollution tax, a cap-and-trade program imposes a price on
pollution, since emitting an extra ton of pollution costs the
polluter whether it is in the form a tax or the cost of purchasing an extra pollution permit.
Both Pigouvian tax schemes and cap-and-trade programs
raise a number of important program design issues. For example, a voluminous body of economic literature has sought
to address the question of how, in cap-and-trade programs,
emissions permits are to be distributed—whether they
should be distributed by auction or on the basis of past emissions, a weak form of grandfathering.66 And most impor65. The “cap” the level of total pollution that will be allowed need
not be a fixed target. Canada’s proposed strategy to meet its commit
ment under the Kyoto Protocol contemplates the setting of the cap by
“carbon intensity” targets. Under this system, the cap is established
by multiplying productive output by some CO2 emissions rate,
which becomes the cap for any given year. Canada Gazette, July
16, 2005, at 2489.
66. This is a weak form of grandfathering because, in comparison with
the form of grandfathering created by the CAA criticized in this Arti
cle, distribution of emissions permits on the basis of historical emis
sions at least does not interfere with the incentive to retire capital,
since keeping around old and polluting capital still represents an op
portunity cost in the form of foregone opportunities to sell those
emissions permits.
The economic literature on the choice between auctioning permits
and giving them away on a “weak grandfathering” basis giving
them away on the basis of historical emissions has considered the
problem from a number of different viewpoints. First, virtually all of
the work done in this area finds that overall social welfare is greater
under an auctioning scheme than under a weak grandfathering
scheme. The most commonly cited reason for this economic result is
that the governmentally collected proceeds from an auction can be
redistributed to reduce existing tax distortions. See, e.g., Dallas
Burtraw et al., The Effect of Allowance Allocation on
the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading (Resources for the Fu
ture Discussion Paper No. 01 30, 2001), available at http://www.
rff.org/Documents/RFF DP 01 30.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2005);
Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, Tradable Carbon Permit Auc
tions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (Re
sources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 98 34, 1998), available
at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF DP 98 34.pdf (last vis
ited Nov. 22, 2005); Ian W.H. Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abate
ment Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted
Factor Markets, 37 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 52 (1999); Ian W.H.
Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of Dis
torting Taxes, 19 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 603 (2000). This ra
tionale disappears, of course, if the proceeds from an auction are
used to fund pork barrel projects rather than recycling the revenues
back to taxpayers. Ian W.H. Parry, Are Tradable Emissions
Permits a Good Idea? (Resources for the Future Issues Brief
No. 02 33, 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/
RFF IB 02 33.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). Another, less dis
cussed reason for favoring auctioning over weak grandfathering is
the rent seeking behavior that takes place over the critical question
of what formula to use in determining historical emissions. Shi Ling
Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 Ecol
ogy L.Q. 303, 372 (2004); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution,
Forcing Democracy, 14 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 300, 323 24 (1995).
Some have explicitly considered the distributional impacts of auc
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tantly, the price signal transmitted by the tax or the permit
price must be an appropriate and binding one; otherwise,
there is no environmental gain at all. But the key characteristic of both Pigouvian taxation and cap-and-trade programs
is that they do not mandate specific pollution control equipment installations. It does not, as traditional pollution regulations do, tell the polluter what to do about the pollution.
This lack of control over the polluter has been the subject
of intense debate. Some who argue for the traditional form
of command-and-control, equipment-based regulation argue that the certainty of emissions reductions provided by
command-and-control regulation is much more certain
than the speculative (in their view) emissions reductions
achieved by market-based mechanisms such as Pigouvian
taxes or a cap-and-trade program.67 Others argue that regulators often lack the monitoring and enforcement tools necessary to carry out market-based mechanisms and that command-and-control can make the best use of scarce administrative resources.68 And a cap-and-trade program must deal
with at least the theoretical possibility of the development
of pollution “hot spots” in which a polluter could comply
by simply buying up pollution allowances.69 On the other
hand, it has been argued by economists and other proponents of market-based mechanisms that mandated pollution controls may not be the most economically efficient
ones and that a Pigouvian tax program or a cap-and-trade
program would permit polluters to find the lowest-cost
ways of reducing emissions.70 As well, it has been argued

67.

68.

69.

70.

tioning versus weak grandfathering, finding that low income house
holds would be worse off and high income households better off un
der a weak grandfathering scheme. U.S. Congressional Budget
Office, U.S. Congress, Who Gains and Who Pays Under
Carbon Allowance Trading? The Distributional Effects
of Alternative Policy Designs (2000), available at http://www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/21xx/doc2104/carbon.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2005). Some have even considered the question from the perspective
of the polluting firms, in modeling the polluting asset values under
the auctioning and weak grandfathering schemes. Dallas
Burtraw et al., The Effect on Asset Values of the Alloca
tion of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances (Resources for
the Future Discussion Paper No. 02 15, 2002), available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF DP 02 15.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2005).
David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innova
tion?, 33 ELR 10094, 10094 (Jan. 2001); David M. Driesen, Is Emis
sions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing the
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 289, 311 22 (1998); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al.,
Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y
F. 231, 274 83 (1999).
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command and Con
trol Efficient? 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 887; Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas
O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology
Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L.J. 729; and Thomas O. McGarity
& Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31
Wake Forest L. Rev. 587 (1996).
Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399,
1409 (2005); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets
and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control
Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 Ecology L.Q. 569, 624 58
(2001). In practice, the few cap and trade programs that have been
implemented have not generated hot spots. Under the SO 2
cap and trade program under the 1990 CAA Amendments, how
ever, only one of the hundreds of regulated utilities chose to purchase
emissions allowances as its sole basis of compliance, Illinois Power,
and that utility still emitted considerably less than it did before the
1990 Amendments. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work,
14 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 309, 329 (2001); Hsu, supra note 66, at 390 91.
Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This
Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 217 (1988), Rob
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that traditional command-and-control regulation imposes a
heavy information burden upon the regulator, relying as it
does on technical information that is in the hands of the regulated parties, which have no incentive to share that information with the regulator.71 These arguments have been
made extensively elsewhere and need not be re-hashed here.
But there are two arguments that have been overlooked by
the parties to this debate.
First, an important but unnoticed psychological effect of
command-and-control regulation is that it has lulled polluters into a pollution stupor. Regulated firms may comply
with regulatory requirements (or not) without thinking
about other ways to reduce pollution. What is there to think
about if, by simply installing pollution control equipment,
one achieves compliance? If we leave with polluters the task
of reducing pollution, and give them rewards for doing so,
we stand a chance of engaging them in the overall goal of reducing pollution. The experience with SO2 emissions trading under the 1990 Acid Rain Program under the CAA is
testimony to this. While SO2 emitters—almost exclusively
coal-fired power plants—reacted with ingenuity to the SO2
emissions trading program, they responded to the more traditional regulation of other pollutants with litigation.72
Possibly the most difficult thing for some environmentalists to accept is that aligning business incentives with
pollution reduction objectives only recruits the attention of
the business side because it appeals to their profit motive.
It somehow seems objectionable to these environmentalists that polluters have not internalized environmental
norms and are merely trying to reduce costs.73 But this
seems meddlesome. Of what relevance is the motivation
for pollution reduction as long as the reductions are actually achieved? Who could have predicted, before the advent of emissions trading, that a pollution control program
could have been designed that would have induced a chief
financial officer of a polluting firm to ask: “How can we reduce emissions?”
Almost everyone at least pays lip service to the notion
that pollution reduction must be accomplished “in partnership” with industry, or with the help or cooperation of industry itself. Few believe we can simply bludgeon industrial
polluters into being green. The SO2 trading program, even
though it had the unfortunate distributive attribute of giving
away the emissions permits for free, achieved what very few
ert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems:
How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J. Econ. Persp.
95 (1989), Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap and
Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31
ELR 10330 (Mar. 2001).
71. This in turn leads to a protracted and unproductive debate over what
Jamie Colburn calls the “politics of the feasible.” Jamison E.
Colburn, The Future of Air Pollution Control in the Corporatist
State, 34 ELR 10577, 10600 (June 2004).
72. Swift, supra note 69, at 357.
73. Michael Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23; Mark Sagoff, The Economy of
the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment 52 (1988)
(decrying the consideration of private preferences, which Michael
Sagoff views as corrupt and irrelevant for public policy purposes,
and trumpeting the advancement of what he views as public interest
preferences); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Price
less: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of
Nothing 221 (New Press 2004) (“Recycling is the gateway drug of
the environmental movement: get the kids hooked on sorting out
their trash and soon they’ll be addicted to harder stuff.”). Id.
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other environmental measures have: it recruited attention
and energy from the business side of regulated industries.74
The second overlooked argument in favor of a Pigouvian
tax or cap-and-trade program is that these programs would
achieve pollution reduction in a capital-neutral manner.
That is, these programs would not mandate or encourage the
overinvestment of polluting capital as other pollution control regulations do. Regulation that requires the installation
of pollution control equipment creates a market for pollution control devices that might or might not otherwise exist.
Apollution tax or tradable permit scheme also creates a market, but the vital difference is that they do not narrow the
market to pollution control devices. To curb the cost of polluting, a firm might find a number of other ways to reduce
their pollution bill, some of which might not involve pollution control equipment at all. Before the advent of the SO2
emissions trading program under the 1990 CAA Amendments, it was thought that the primary means of compliance
would involve the installation of scrubbers.75 Once SO2
emissions trading began, however, firms found a variety of
ways to collect enough emissions permits to cover their
emissions, without necessarily installing scrubbers.76
This is not to argue that emissions reductions are irrelevant. I do not argue that this industrial feel-good story
should not be viewed as the ultimate purpose of marketbased instruments such as Pigouvian taxes and cap-andtrade programs. Rather, the point of a Pigouvian tax or capand-trade program is to accomplish the same emissions reductions, or perhaps greater emissions reductions, overall,
as does a traditional command-and-control program. An insufficient reduction in emissions should not be blamed on
the concept of Pigouvian taxation or emissions trading. The
environmental success of such a program is predicated upon
the appropriateness of the price signal sent by the tax or tradable permit price. That is, the tax should be high enough, or
the number of tradable permits small enough, to actually result in sufficient emissions reduction. The greatest problem
with President George W. Bush’s “Clear Skies” pollution
program, for example, is its lack of ambition, setting lenient
pollution reduction targets that culminate in 2018.77 Fairly
dramatic cuts in pollution can be achieved, and must be
achieved, far earlier than 2018. But it would be misguided to
blame the emissions trading concept, and not President
Bush, for this fecklessness. Two competing pollution control bills were pending before the 108th Congress, both of
which would have introduced far more ambitious goals for
pollution reduction, and both of which contemplated emissions trading.78
74. Hsu, supra note 66, at 384 85.
75. Swift, supra note 69, at 330 31.
76. Id. at 327 28.
77. Clear Skies Act of 2003, S. 485, 108th Cong. §§410, 453, 473
(2003).
78. S. 485, the president’s Clear Skies plan, sponsored by Sen. James
Inhofe (R Okla.), would have capped NOx emissions, SO2 emis
sions, and mercury emissions in incremental stages from 2008 to
2018. Competing bills S. 843, cosponsored by Sens. Thomas Carper
(D Del.), Lincoln Chafee (R R.I.), and Judd Gregg (R N.H.), and S.
5366, sponsored by Sen. James Jeffords (I Vt.), would have imposed
lower caps and at earlier dates. See, e.g., STAPPA & ALAPCO,
Analysis of Associations’ May 7, 2002 Principles for a
Multi Pollutant Strategy for Power Plants (2003), avail
able at http://www.4cleanair.org/members/committee/energy/Multi
PollutantChart2.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
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The point of a Pigouvian tax or cap-and-trade program is
to incentivize emissions reductions while avoiding distortion of the pollution reduction decision. To be sure, the installation pollution control equipment should be among the
options available to polluters looking to reduce emissions.
But other options must be available, including those that retain polluters’ ability to forestall capital decisions. Depriving polluters of that option and mandating the immediate installation of pollution control equipment may deprive
us of an opportunity in the future to achieve potentially
greater emissions reductions. This may take the form of an
even more effective means of pollution reduction, or a transformation of the production process, outcomes that may
not seem feasible with pollution control equipment locked
into place.
There are other prophylactic advantages to a Pigouvian
tax or emissions trading scheme. If the level of the tax or the
quantity of permits proves to be inappropriate, it is a less
daunting legal prospect to change them. It may still be very
daunting—no regulated industry will quietly accept a
ratcheting up of stringency. But some might, in a competitive environment, if they sense that the higher cost of compliance might be more of a problem for their competitors.
The high price of jet fuel, for example, has hit all of the commercial airlines hard, but in relative terms, it has worked to
the advantage of the healthier ones, such as Southwest Airlines, by pushing their competitors closer to the brink of insolvency.79 In any case, changing the level of a Pigouvian
tax or the quantity of emissions permits, while politically
difficult, would certainly be easier than requiring the installation of new pollution control equipment.
The final advantage to a Pigouvian tax or emissions trading scheme may be the most important of all: a Pigouvian
tax or tradable permit scheme leaves open the possibility of
future regulation of other pollutants. This is of particular importance since at some point, the Bush Administration’s recalcitrance notwithstanding, some form of regulation of
CO2 emissions will come to the United States. World opinion of the United States is already that of an environmental
pariah; it is only a matter of time when American self-interest will require that it adopt some CO2 emissions measures
just to appease its trading partners, if not an epiphany that
global climate change is a problem.80
As is the case when we seek to further reduce emissions
by raising the Pigouvian tax level or the quantity of emissions permits, it must certainly be easier to introduce new
regulation of CO2 emissions if a polluting firm has not yet
sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into a SO2-reducing
scrubber or a NOx-reducing device. Especially now, when
many CO2-emitting firms are smart enough to look beyond
the Bush Administration and anticipate CO2 regulation,81
79. Mary Schlangenstein, Southwest Airlines Profit Jumps: Lower Fuel
Costs Let Airliner Nearly Triple Its Bottom Line, Wash. Post, Apr.
15, 2005, at E5. Of course, subsequent to publication of that article,
Delta and Northwest Airlines have entered bankruptcy proceedings.
80. Senator Inhofe, the Chair of the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works and the Senate sponsor of President Bush’s “Clear
Skies” pollution bill, is still calling global climate change “the great
est hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.” Senate Floor
Statement by James M. Inhofe, Jan. 4, 2005, available at http://
inhofe.senate.gov/pressreleases/climateupdate.htm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2005).
81. For example, American Electric Power, one of the largest coal burn
ing utilities in the United States, has voluntarily joined the Chicago
Climate Exchange for trading emissions permits for CO2.
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allowing them to leave their options open rather than forcing
them down the path of certain pollution control equipment
seems to be the best “no-regrets” approach. Also, as deadly a
pollution problem as SO2, NOx, and mercury pose, a strong
argument can be made that CO2 poses the most serious problem in that it poses a catastrophic risk.82 Choosing the regulatory instrument that best paves the way for (or least gets in
the way of) CO2 regulation seems to be the safest strategy.
VIII. Conclusion
NSR is a rotten concept. Implicit in the very existence of
NSR is the concept of grandfathering, the idea that we
should discriminate on the basis of timing, NSR being the
means of discrimination. Our hubris as lawyers prevents us
from seeing the impossibility of devising a rule that is fair
for everyone, and also prevents us from seeing the gross inefficiencies created by our good intentions. Environmentalists must discard this legalistic way of thinking, arguing not
for a specific conception of NSR but a wholesale abandonment of grandfathering. There is nothing fair about allowing
polluters to continue polluting just because they have always done so.
NSR also highlights the core problem with traditional notions of pollution control regulation. Bizarre as it may seem,
a public policy of requiring the installation of pollution controls may be the wrong way to proceed environmentally. It
seems so simple and logical to simply require the installation of pollution control equipment as a way to reduce pollution. And yet, this is mistaken. It is mistaken because pollution reduction is too closely intertwined with a variety of private operating decisions that are best left to the operator.
What government does best is determine what is harmful
to the public, not meddle with complex operational decisions. A governmental agency like EPA can readily determine the extent of harm caused by various amounts of pollu82. Richard Posner has recently completed the book Catastrophe, argu
ing for greater regulation of greenhouse gas emission because of the
catastrophic risks posed by global climate change. Richard
Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2005).
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tion and translate that into a Pigouvian tax level or a quantity
of emissions permits. Certainly, this process would be
fraught with political peril, but at least EPA does not have
the information disadvantage that it has when it tries to determine what pollution control equipment it can require of
polluters.83 There is even the hope that in an argument over
the appropriate level of taxation or the appropriate quantity
of emissions permits, the debate will shift to the harm
caused by pollution. This would be a welcome shift, away
from the perplexing debates we currently have over what
kinds of pollution control mechanisms are affordable or cost
effective. This is the information problem that cripples EPA
when it tries to implement traditional, command-and-control forms of pollution regulation.84
We have, after 35 years of experience with environmental
law, failed to learn a fundamental lesson about government
regulation: we cannot, through requiring the installation of
pollution controls, instill in polluters a sense of environmental stewardship. We simply cannot treat polluters as we treat
criminals. It works only passably in our criminal justice system (although some would disagree), and it is grossly inappropriate in our system of environmental law. Polluting is
sometimes worth it, sometimes not, but the underlying productive activity is often impossible to separate from the
harmful act of polluting. The only way to reconcile the productive activity with the harmful byproduct of pollution is to
price the pollution and let the market sort out what pollution
is worth it, and what is not worth it. Government must not
get involved with the noble yet doomed effort to obsess with
treating everyone fairly. That is the invitation to rent-seeking that has plagued environmental law. If government concentrates on that which it has the expertise to handle—the
harm side of the ledger—we might get an environmental
law that is actually focused on the environment and not on
the regulated industries.
83. Colburn, supra note 71, at 10601.
84. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a
New Paradigm?, 89 Geo. L.J. 257, 263 70 (2001) (discussing the
“information bottlenecking” that limits the ability of EPA to carry
out conventional regulation).

